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The challenges of countering fraud in Malta’s remote gaming industry 
 
Introduction 
Gambling’s association with trickery, cheating and fraud has a long lineage, far predating the 
emergence of the internet as a medium for wagering activities. Indeed, gambling itself has 
been invariably portrayed as both a criminal and criminogenic activity (Morse and Goss, 
2007). Across the globe, jurisdictions have endeavoured to regulate gambling, in order to 
prevent crime and disorder. Thus, as opportunities for gambling have proliferated, states and 
a global commercial gambling industry have sought to institute laws, policies and processes 
that minimise the risk of fraud and other forms of criminal activity (Banks and Waugh, 
2019). Yet the development of the internet as a commercial and public vehicle that provides 
many citizens of world with unfettered access to wagering activities presents new and 
significant challenges to those charged with ensuring gambling’s continued governance, 
security and profit. 
This paper explores the challenges of countering fraud in Malta’s remote gaming1 
industry. By way of introduction, the paper provides a brief overview of the development of 
online gaming, before summarising previous academic literature focused on the 
interrelationships between online gambling and crime. Discussion then turns to explore the 
nature of fraud in Malta’s remote gaming industry and the challenges associated with 
reporting and responding to online gambling related fraud. Data is derived from semi-
structured interviews with key personnel working in regulatory roles within the sector. 
 
1 The terms gambling and gaming are often used interchangeably. Gaming is favoured by the industry, as it is 
more associated with play and leisure.  
Consequently, this paper offers rare and unique insight into crime threats pertaining to the 
remote gaming industry in Malta that is likely to have international applicability. 
 
The development of remote gambling 
In little over two decades, remote gambling has developed into a heterogenous, highly 
accessible and increasingly complex marketplace worth in excess of US$23 billion (H2 
Gambling Capital, 2015). Comprising of 3,500 gambling sites located across 70 different 
countries, global gamblers have access to a panoply of online casinos, sports books, bingo 
sites, poker rooms, lotteries, fantasy sports operators, skill game sites, betting exchanges, and 
forex and binary trading sites (Casino City, 2019). It is unsurprising then that international 
studies (Williams and Wood, 2009; Wardle et al., 2011; Gainsbury, 2012) indicate that 
between 1 and 30 per cent of adults have gambled remotely, with internet gambling 
representing the fastest growing segment of the industry (Global Market Insights, 2020).  
Remote gambling is forecast to continue to exhibit an upward trend in terms of participation 
rates, industry profits and state taxation revenues, as new markets emerge and states open up 
their markets to competition (Ibid.).  
The Republic of Malta is emblematic of the success of remote gambling across many 
countries of the world. Despite being the European Union’s smallest member state in terms of 
territory and population, Malta has emerged as one of principal destinations for remote 
gaming businesses. Quick to respond to the evolution of the internet as a new medium for 
gambling, in 2004 Malta became the first European Union member state to endorse across-
the-board legislation on remote gaming. By 2017, the gaming sector had established itself as 
the country’s third largest industry, contributing between 10-12% of Malta’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (Malta Gaming Authority, 2018). In total, 294 gaming companies are located 
in Malta, whilst 625 remote gaming licenses have been issued. As a consequence of Malta’s 
favourable tax regime, as of 2019, the country is now home to many of the remote gaming 
industry’s leading operators, including Unibet, Tipico, Betsson, Paddy Power, Betfair, 
bet365, and DraftKings (Strickland Jr., Zammit, Portanier & Baron, 2019). Consequently, 
Malta generates approximately €60m in gaming tax revenues, whilst the industry employs 
6,673 full-time staff (Malta Gaming Authority, 2018).  
Given the marked growth of remote gaming in Malta, the significant sums of money 
held in online accounts and flowing between gambling operators and myriad ancillary 
organisations, it is unsurprising that the industry is attractive to criminals. The criminal 
activities associated with remote gaming are vast, can be high-tech in nature and involve a 
variety of different methods that continue to evolve over time (Zerafa, 2016). This is 
evidenced by a growing number of studies which have examined gambling and crime in 
virtual environments, and are considered in the next section of this article. 
 
Previous Literature on Gambling and Crime 
Whilst the manifold actual, possible, and probable interconnections between gambling and 
crime have been well-established, the relationship between the two has altered significantly, 
as consequence of the advent of the internet and the evolution of digital media and 
information communication technologies. In response, a small but developing body of 
academic literature has examined the interrelationships between online gambling and crime 
(McMullan and Rege, 2007, 2010, 2012; McMullan, 2012; Banks 2012, 2013, 2014; Zerafa, 
2016; Banks, 2017). Collectively, these studies demonstrate several crime threats and 
problems that may impact remote gambling operators, their customers and wider society. 
This includes illegal and underage internet gambling, cyber-extortion and (distributed) denial 
of service attacks (DDoS), money laundering and terrorist financing, gambling-related crime, 
match fixing, and theft and fraud. 
 Crimes relating to remote gambling may be committed by a range of different groups 
and individuals. For Banks (2012: 3), the remote gambling environment is a ‘contested space’ 
in which site operators, employees, customers and ‘unwanted third parties’ may interact. 
Such intermingling creates ‘opportunities for multi-various forms of criminal activity and 
[the construction of] rhizomatic relations between perpetrators and victims’ (Ibid.). 
McMullan and Rege’s (2010) web-based analysis of crimes that have occurred in and around 
remote gambling sites suggests that online offenders engaged in acts of extortion, theft and 
fraud range from solo actors to amorphous and loosely connected criminal assemblages. 
McMullan and Rege’s typology posits three distinct categories of ‘virtual villain’. First, 
‘cybernomads’ consist of solo actors who typically purchase or construct digital ‘toolkits’ 
that allow individuals to steal or defraud remote gambling businesses and their customers. 
More sophisticated ‘professional’ cybernomads may write malware or steal and sell gambling 
site customers’ personal information. Second, small-scale organised crime groups or ‘dot.con 
teams’ involve a range of individuals, including players, gambling site owners, managers and 
employees, software developers, and consultants who work together to commit acts of money 
laundering, fraud or theft. Third, the most sophisticated ‘criminal assemblages’ consist of 
dynamic and complex professional criminal networks who continuously engage in money 
laundering, phishing, fraud and extortion activities. 
 Fraud and theft that occurs at or around online gambling sites is a particular concern 
for legitimate gambling operators and their clientele. Such crimes can impact the playing 
experience, undermine the reputation of online gambling, and reduce operators' ability to 
retain the custom of existing players and recruit new ones (Banks, 2014). Indeed, a lack of 
trust in payment processes, site security and the legitimacy of operators are cited as principal 
reasons why some citizens do not gamble online (Ipsos Reid, 2005; Wood and Williams, 
2010; Gainsbury, Parke and Suhonen, 2013). For example, one-third of 12,000 respondents to 
a worldwide survey on internet gambling, recognised the difficulty in verifying the fairness of 
games, while over twenty-five per cent expressed concerns regarding the safety of the money 
deposited at sites (Williams and Wood, 2010). Elsewhere, a study by the American Gaming 
Association (2006) noted that over half (55%) of internet casino gamblers surveyed believed 
that they were cheated by site operators. Parke et al.'s (2007: 14) survey of 10,000 online 
gamblers delivered a similar finding, with the survey authors noting that:  
 
Levels of mistrust and cynicism are epitomised by the fact that only half of 
respondents felt that online gambling software was fair and random, and in fact, 
over a third of respondents thought there was an "on/off switch that could turn the 
software in favour of the operator". Consequently, ensuring that websites are safe 
and secure, games are fair and businesses are operated with integrity is essential if 
online gambling is to sustain.  
 
 Two principal types of fraud impacting the remote gaming industry are discernible , 
and although the profit motive remains the same, they typically operate in a distinct manner. 
Internal fraud involves organisation insiders, such as gambling site owners, operators, or 
other personnel, who defraud the gambling company or its customers. External fraud involves 
players or 'criminal entrepreneurs' who target sites and/ or their clientele. Whilst Zerafa 
(2016) suggests that external forms of fraud are more prevalent, two of the most celebrated 
frauds which occurred at the height of the online poker boom involved gambling insiders. 
The superuser scandals involving Absolute Poker and UltimateBet – two of the then leading 
online operators – caused widespread consternation amongst internet gambling communities, 
leaving a legacy of distrust amongst players. Indeed, Woods and Griffiths (2008: 90) note 
that: 
 
There was a lot of suspicion amongst the professional players that sometimes they 
were playing against computer programs (bots), particularly when they lost. 
Similarly, there was fear amongst some that certain computer viruses could be 
used by another player that would allow them to see other players’ cards. Talking 
to other players using the chat facility was one way that a player could be sure 
that they were in fact playing with real people. 
 
As detailed above, research evidence gathered from gamers and open access materials 
suggests that fraud relating to online gambling is a notable issue of concern for the industry. 
However, to date, no study has reported on the views and experiences of gaming operators 
and regulators. In response, this qualitative research study considers data derived from 
interviews with professionals and stakeholders from Malta’s remote gaming industry to 
provide new insights into crime and online gambling. The methodological approach 
employed in this study is discussed below. 
 
Method 
Six individuals from three major stakeholders in Malta’s remote gaming industry were 
interviewed for this study. Ethical approval was granted by the University of [Name 
Anonymised]. The study was submitted to the [Name Anonymised] Ethics Committee, in line 
with policy and associated procedures that are applied to all research undertaken under the 
auspices of the University. All participants were given information regarding the research and 
gave full consent to participate in the interviews. 
To date, research studies pertaining to the topic of crime in the remote gaming 
industry that incorporate the perspectives of gambling operators and regulators are scarce (a 
notable exception is the work of Brooks (2012) who interviewed five gambling operator 
personnel for his study on money laundering). This is undoubtedly a consequence of the 
reputational and commercial imperatives that impact the degree to which gambling 
businesses and those charged with their governance are willing to participate in academic 
research. In addition, access to potential research participants may be challenging for 
researchers who are situated outside of the gambling industry. Thus, whilst gambling 
operators and regulators may not be consider ‘hard to reach’ research subjects as defined by 
the research methods literature, they can be difficult to access for those researchers who do 
not have the requisite personal contacts or links to ‘gatekeepers’.  
This study’s originality is, in part, because data has been gathered from key 
stakeholders working in one of the world’s largest remote gaming industries. This was 
achieved through the first author’s role within the Malta Gaming Authority (MGA) which 
enabled him to recruit research participants from across the sector. Table 1 details the 
characteristics of the interviewees; the organisation they work for, the department in which 
they work, and an overview of their duties. The research study sought to generate a holistic 
understanding of the challenges of countering fraud in Malta’s remote gaming market 
through the unique perspectives of professionals working for the three key industry 
stakeholders; the MGA, Malta’s police force, and licensed remote gaming operators. As such, 
although the research sample is small, it includes key individuals working within the MGA 
(including Information Computer Technology (ICT) & Records Department, Enforcement 
Directorate, Player Support Department, Legal Department), the Economic Crime Unit of the 
Malta Police Force, and the Fraud Department of a Malta Licensed Remote Gaming 
Operator. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Interviews were conducted by the first author either at the interviewees’ place of work or at a 
mutually convenient location. The interviews were semi-structured in nature, in order to 
gather a breadth and depth of qualitative data regarding fraud in Malta’s remote gaming 
industry. Such an approach enabled the interviewees to detail their own experiences and 
opinions regarding the challenges of identifying, preventing, and responding to criminal 
activity, and enabled the interviewer to probe for further information regarding some of the 
issues raised. Interviews took between 60 and 120 minutes and were audio recorded. 
Interviews were transcribed and, where necessary, translated into English. The 
transcripts were explored using an interpretive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
After familiarising ourselves with the data through preliminary readings, the research team 
undertook line-by-line coding, formulating initial category and sub-category codes. Codes 
were then categorised into a smaller number of themes, in accordance with their semantic 
meaning. This analytical approach enabled the initial categories to be reduced to a smaller 
number of themes. It is these themes that structure the results section below, wherein quotes 
from the interviews are employed to support the presented analysis.  
  
Research Findings 
Research findings are divided into two sections. First, the forms, features and organisational 
dynamics of frauds committed in and around Malta’s remote gaming industry are explored. 
Second, the potential reasons for the underreporting of such offences are examined.  
 
The forms and features of fraud in Malta’s remote gaming industry 
In Malta, as in other jurisdictions across the globe, online gambling is seen as a ‘place’ in 
which consumers can engage in a range of 'safe' aleatory activities. However, the 
geographical indeterminacy of the internet, coupled with the limitations of state-based law 
and the itinerant nature of web sites, means that opportunities for criminal enterprise present 
themselves in the online gambling arena. All interviewees agreed that fraud presents the 
principal crime challenge to Malta’s remote gaming industry, though it manifests itself in 
diverse ways and encompasses various other sub-categories of crime. For example, the 
research participant who works in the MGA Enforcement Directorate noted that fraud may be 
committed by a variety of different groups and individuals involved with the remote gaming 
sector and encompass a range of acts:  
 
[F]raud is one of the most common crimes found in remote gaming. However, it 
can take various forms. The fraud could be from the player’s side, it can be from 
the employer himself or the remote gaming company’s employees who defraud 
the game itself; and also other forms of crimes where indirectly there will be 
fraud, for example match fixing. 
 
All participants suggested that identity-related crimes are the most common type of fraud that 
take place crime in Malta’s remote gaming industry. Operators may receive tampered 
documentation or uncover players who are using the identification cards or utility bills of 
others. Whilst such an approach may be employed for the purposes of money laundering 
(Levi, 2009), the participants  from the MGA’s Legal Department suggested that bonus abuse 
is the principal reason why individuals may create multiple aliases and forge or 
misappropriate documentation:  
 
When you have an operation that is of low transaction value, that is where you 
need a high number of transactions, where profit is based a lot on customer 
acquisition and retention, and therefore there are a lot of bonuses and other 
incentives on offer to the players, one of the most [common] frauds that has 
developed online is the possibility of an individual abusing the introductory 
bonuses awarded by creating multiple identities and opening new accounts.  
 
Such an approach can be a highly lucrative criminal venture. For example, in the UK, Andre 
Ospiau was jailed for three years for amassing around £80,000 from bonus related fraud  
involving 5,900 passports, identity cards, bills and associated documentation (Garlitos, 2012). 
Whilst research participants recognised that preventing the opening of multiple accounts by a 
single individual can prove challenging, Know Your Customer (KYC) processes are often 
effective in identifying cases of identity fraud.  
KYC processes are also key to uncovering credit card fraud involving bank card and 
pin details which have been stolen and sold online. Examining claims that credit cards have 
been used fraudulently is a regular activity of gambling operators and can prove challenging. 
The research participant working in the Fraud Department of an online gaming operator 
suggests that the illegal use of credit card information is commonplace: 
 
This information is very easily accessible. That is if you require stolen credit 
cards - in a flash you can get a spreadsheet with all the details and you can use 
them the way you want. Because a lot of people see it [(gambling)] as easy 
money, but remote gaming is a risk. If you are going to play a game…you can 
lose your money but potentially you can win. Therefore, they will eliminate the 
risk and use other people’s money. If it comes good, it’s good, if it goes wrong, 
they don’t lose anything, they have just spent an hour [of their] time [playing]. 
That’s the mentality.  
 
The participant goes on to note that often in such cases the victim has no relationship with 
either the operator or the individual playing on the operator’s website. By contrast, the 
interviewee working in the MGA’s Player Support Department notes that claims of credit 
card fraud are frequently unproven, with evidence indicating that it is the owner of the card 
who has gambled and then fraudulently lied about their card’s misuse in an attempt to recoup 
their losses. 
 Other common player behaviours include chip dumping2 and collusion3 between 
multiple players at the table. The research participant from the Fraud Department noted that 
whilst the dumping of large amounts of money for money laundering purposes is easy to 
identify, collusion at a table that finishes with the dumping or losing of chips to the ‘chip 
leader’ is much harder to identify, as effective automated processes are yet to be devised:  
 
2 Chip dumping is a strategy whereby one player deliberately loses their poker chips to another. Such an 
approach may feature in cash games as part of coordinated play between two or more players in order to launder 
money. 
3 This typically involves two or more players coordinating their play so as to defraud other players. 
 
Where you have chip-dumping you have to see it yourself. You have to analyse 
the game, you have to see when the move of the chip-dumping took place. As 
soon as a game finishes [the hand history] is available as a document to the agent. 
That need to be ‘hands on’. It is very much subject to interpretation. It is difficult 
to automate it.  
 
Coordinated play, particularly where it is supported by technology such as bots4, can be 
highly lucrative. For example, players at PokerStars were defrauded of approximately US$1.5 
million at fifty cent, one dollar and two dollar pot limit Omaha tables by a team of players 
primarily from Russia and Kazakhstan (Glatzer, 2015). 
 Whilst the primary forms of fraud detailed above are not contingent on any 
technological competence, other forms of fraud require the offender to be able to modify 
digital data. For example, unlicensed websites may adopt the MGA’s logo or detail that they 
are licensed by them on their site. As Banks (2017: 205) notes, unlicensed sites use ‘fake kite 
marks of social responsibility…to indicate that they hold an appropriate operating licence, are 
accredited by an independent third party or subject to regulatory oversight and dispute 
resolution procedures.’. In addition, as the research participant from the Information 
Computer Technology and Records Department highlights, an unlicensed operator may use 
vague references to the MGA in order to indicate that their site is legitimate, whilst seeking to 
hide its online presence from the regulator: 
 
 
4 A bot is a computer program that performs automated tasks. For example, a poker bot is a computerised 
poker player that is programmed to play hands of poker.  
[W]e frequently find that there are operators who state that they are licensed by 
us, and they write it somewhere in the terms and conditions; hidden, so that we, 
as regulators, would not find it so easily. They state that their jackpot is licensed 
by “the Maltese regulator” instead of by the “Malta Gaming Authority”, so that if 
anyone intentionally searched for the term in Google, they wouldn’t be able to 
find it. 
 
Other fraudsters may reproduce games that belong to other operators or ‘lift’ aspects of a 
site’s design or content. Such forgeries can dupe unsuspecting customers into depositing 
money and wagering it at unlicensed sites which fail to pay any winnings to players.  
 In addition to the principal forms of fraud detailed above, our participants made 
reference to the alteration of games, ‘taking-over’ of accounts, and distributed denial of 
service attacks which had resulted from the actions of more technically skilled fraudsters. 
Collectively, the crimes detailed by our interviewees demonstrate that the types and 
techniques of fraud committed at or around online gaming sites regulated by the MGA are 
numerous. Despite this, reported offences remain low. The next section explores the reasons 
why such crimes are underreported, the implications for effective regulation and intervention, 
and potential remedies. 
 
The reporting of fraud 
Despite recognition by our participants that fraud is a perennial problem in Malta’s remote 
gaming industry, there is little by way of data regarding the extent of such crimes. The 
principal source of data is the annual report issued by the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit 
(FIAU) in Malta. The report documents the number of ‘Suspicious Transaction Reports’5 
(STRs) received by the FIAU from a range of financial institutions including remote gaming 
operators over the previous year. Evidence indicates a notable growth in the number of STRs 
filed by remote gaming companies, rising from 87 in 2016 to 218 in 2017, to 724 in 2018, 
and to 1445 in 2019. In 2019, 52% of STRs received by the FIAU were filed by remote 
gaming companies, with fraud representing ‘the most prevalent suspected predicate offence’ 
with 596 instances reported across all STRs (Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit, 2020: 34). 
However, the number of reported STRs still remains low, given that the gaming industry in 
Malta comprises of approximately 300 operators holding in excess of 600 gaming licences. 
Our participants indicated that many incidents of fraud go unreported and unrecorded, and 
that this stems from a number of factors. 
 A notable concern of operators is that the frequent reporting of potential cases of 
fraud may damage their reputation with the regulator, lead to greater oversight and scrutiny, 
and have implications for the renewal of their licence. As the research participant working in 
the ICT & Records Department notes: ‘I think that there are some operators that don’t even 
report [cases of fraud] in the first place so that they do not become a concern of the 
regulator’. To resolve the situation, some customers who are victims of fraud are simply ‘paid 
off’. For example, the member of staff from the Player Support Department at the MGA 
highlights how: 
 
[M]any operators would not want the case to end up with us, for the simple 
reason that it could attract unnecessary or unwanted attention. Maybe it will lead 
 
5 Suspicious Transaction Reports can relate to a variety of potential offences including: corruption and bribery, 
fraud, illegal gambling, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, insider trading and 
market manipulation, participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering, tax offences, and terrorism 
including financing terrorism,  
to the MGA investigating them in some way. I believe that this is what most 
[operators] would say. There are some of them that say, “I don’t want the 
complaints at MGA full stop, so just pay the player off, close the account and he 
will not come again”. Some do it for the sake of expediency. The operator just 
pays and moves on. 
 
Whilst reimbursing the player may represent one mechanism through which operators can 
resolve a case where fraud is alleged, such an outcome may only be warranted after detailed 
investigation. Indeed, the participant from an online gaming operator’s Fraud Department 
suggests that one of the reasons for the underreporting of such offences by operators is that 
they deem themselves, at least in the first instance, best placed to investigate potential frauds. 
For example, our interviewee notes how in cases where players suggest that they have been 
the victim of fraud: ‘We never escalate it, because we deal with it at source. We do research. 
Often the player has broken the terms and conditions [of wagering with us]. I don’t need to 
escalate such cases’. The staff member noted that remote gaming operators have an array of 
reliable systems that allow them to investigate the crime of fraud ‘in-house’ and hence be 
able to determine whether a client is being fraudulent or not. In addition, certain operators are 
capable of identifying a player’s current location, his or her gaming patterns, and his or her 
possible relationships with ‘clients of concern’ that have, or have attempted to, previously 
circumnavigate or corrupt their site’s systems or processes. 
 Compounding this perspective is the inability of the MGA as regulator and Malta 
Police Force to solve or resolve some crimes committed against operators. The member of 
staff from the Player Support Department at the MGA suggests that in some cases ‘if, for 
example, we take a DDoS, some offenders are never caught…they mask their IP, use proxies 
properly. There are those who are very capable of hiding their identity and location, and are 
not caught.’ Moreover, it is suggested that the ‘fissured structure of law enforcement within 
and between nation states’ (McMullan and Rege, 2007: 659) undermines attempts to address 
cybercrimes such as fraud where they cross national boundaries. Such challenges are 
compounded by the slow development of technical knowledge and competence, alongside 
limited resources, which mean that police forces are unable to collect evidence, trace, 
apprehend and eventually prosecute online offenders. As such reporting potential offences of 
fraud are deemed by operators to be costly, time consuming and unfruitful. 
  Whilst many offences committed by fraudsters against online gaming operators may 
go unreported, the research participant at Malta Gaming Authority’s Enforcement Directorate 
suggests that ‘high value’ offences are always reported to the unit for investigation: ‘[M]any 
companies are quite reluctant to report [incidents of fraud], but they have bench marks. So if 
you have a case that involves more than X amount [of money] they will report it, otherwise 
they try to avoid it.’ This is reinforced by the Officer at Malta Police Force’s Economic 
Crime Unit who notes that whilst online gaming operators’ commercial imperatives mean 
that they will seek to avoid public scrutiny where possible, they will report monetarily 
sizeable incidents of fraud: 
 
when [the] criminal activity impacts the remote gaming operator in a way and 
manner where the losses incurred are substantial, or when the criminal activity 
gives rise to certain legal and/or jurisdictional issues that only the Malta Police 
Force would have the legal capabilities to deal with. 
 
The officer goes on to state that regular and consistent reporting by operators, and a 
willingness to share information, would benefit operators and  Malta’s remote gaming 
industry more broadly. Such a viewpoint is echoed by the research participant from MGA’s 
Enforcement Directorate who notes that information sharing depends on operators utilising 
reporting processes. The interviewee further highlights how remote gaming operators 
reporting of incidents of fraud will enable the organised compilation of intelligence which 
can later be shared with a view to enhancing operator and regulators’ approaches to crime 
prevention: 
 
It is worth reporting the crime even if the operator or player are not going to gain 
anything. For what reason? The reason is that by collecting these type of reports, the 
authorities will be building intelligence. […] Yes, the victim can say I am not going to 
gain anything in the short term if I report it to the Malta Police Force. But to the 
authorities this information is of great use in preventing other operators becoming a 
victim. 
 
 Moreover, the participant explains that this intelligence would allow the industry to better 
evaluate the illicit methods adopted by fraudsters. This information may then be 
communicated to institutions such as Europol, in order to facilitate the sharing of information 
across European Union member countries. Thus, whilst a remote gaming operator may not 
find any immediate and direct benefit to reporting incidents of fraud, the report could 
contribute to reducing such crimes in remote gaming in the future. This sense of 
collectiveness was echoed by other research participants who suggested that it is only by 
gaming operators working together, sharing data and reporting incidents of (potential) crime 
to regulators that the remote gaming industry can further its fight against fraud.  
 
Conclusion 
This study’s originality stems from data gathered from six individuals working at three 
principal stakeholders in Malta’s remote gaming industry. Academic studies that engage 
gambling operators and regulators are rare, given the commercial and reputational 
sensitivities that inhibit their willingness to partake in such research. This study offers insight 
into the extent and nature of fraud in and around online gambling sites. Our participants 
suggest that fraud is a perennial problem for the industry, with gamblers, operators, and 
members of the general public victims of gambling-related offences. The forms and 
organisational dynamics of fraud vary, but principal offences relate to credit card and identity 
fraud, collusion, and account takeover. Evidence also indicates that although the number of 
offences reported by the gaming industry continues to grow, many cases of fraud go 
unreported and unrecorded. The interviewees highlight how online gaming operators’ failure 
to reports incidents of fraud stem from several interrelated reasons. In particular, operators 
may be concerned about the reputational damage that may result from incidents of fraud in 
and around their websites, as well as coming under increased scrutiny from their regulator. 
Increased reporting may also lead to a loss of public confidence in the safety and security of a 
company’s gaming website, resulting in reduced uptake by new players and the retention of 
existing customers. Additionally, participants advocate that operators may see themselves as 
best placed to investigate potential cases of fraud, particularly as liaising with regulators and 
law enforcement agencies can be resource intensive and not lead to a satisfactory outcome. 
Overcoming operator concerns and encouraging a culture of reporting and 
information sharing is paramount, if regulators, law enforcement agencies and operators are 
to prevent and effectively investigate incidents of fraud. Whilst our participants indicate that 
there is a ‘tipping’ point’ where cases of fraud that might cost the operator notable sums of 
money will be reported, it is essential that all fraudulent activities are reported to and 
recorded by regulators. Though many of these reports may not lead to a successful 
investigation, a culture of regular reporting will facilitate a stable system of information 
sharing, underpinning a holistic intelligence gathering process. Such a process will enable 
greater insight into and understanding of the evolving organisational dynamics of fraudulent 
practices in and around the online gaming industry, and enable law enforcement agencies, 
regulators and operators to develop, institute and enhance mechanisms and processes through 
which to combat such offences. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the research sample 











The MAG ICT and Records Department is responsible for: IT administration; systems maintenance and 
ongoing development; technology and infrastructure planning; IT security; implementation and 
maintenance of the Authority’s CRM system; management of the information systems in general. 
The department is also charged with the archiving, scanning, and registration of documentation that is 








The Enforcement Directorate is responsible for: field inspections in Malta’s land -based gambling 
outlets; ensuring compliance; criminal probity vetting; on-site visits to review Anti-Money Laundering 
(AML) policies and procedures; following up on intelligence reports in order to conduct investigations 








The Player Support Department manages complaints emanating from players engaged with one or more 







Legal Department The Legal Department oversees the MGA’s legal affairs: reviewing and drafting internal and external 
contracts; providing legal advice; representing the Authority during Court sittings; liaising with the 
Attorney General’s office; reviewing legislation; public consultations; the implementation and 







The Economic Crime Unit is charged with investigating crimes such as: fraud, misappropriation, 
forgery, and embezzlement; bounced, stolen, and forged cheques; plastic card fraud; foreign counterfeit 
currency; usury; intellectual property right infringements; VAT fraud and misappropriation cases; 








Fraud Department The Fraud Department provides: key operational metrics and statistics relating to the playing patterns 
of players; establishes and manages payments made by players; seeks to detect any fraudulent activities 
by players. This research participant is an expert in the field of fraud in remote gaming having focused 
his post-graduate studies on the subject matter, alongside  over ten years-experience of working in 
Fraud Departments for some of Malta’s most successful remote gaming operators. 
 
